

Smallpox Decision Support Matrix

		REPORT (SIR)	ACTIONS					
		INDICATOR	Trigger-On	C4ISR	Access Control	Security Response	Trigger-Off	Command Information
1		Case / Outbreak Scenarios						
	a	Smallpox diagnosed on Post (Single case constitutes an outbreak and indicates probable use of Smallpox as a BW agent)	Diagnosis by medical personnel	Patient treated. Preventive Medicine (PM) conducts contact tracing and treatment (vaccinate contacts, and contacts of contacts and monitor them for fever). Case finding initiated. PM reports cases to AMSA, local public health. DHS contacts CMD GRP, RMC. Health Information Operations (HIO) initiated.	Consider limiting access to the installation. Planned visits by groups may be cancelled or restricted	Consider change in FPCON IAW DoD Smallpox Response Plan	Smallpox patient is isolated and close contacts identified.	Report sent up Military, Medical, and PAO channels.
	b	Smallpox diagnosed in DoD beneficiary living in the surrounding community	Diagnosis made by civilian physician. Reported to Local PH Department and MTF.	Insure adequate treatment. Consider transport to military MTF. Preventive Medicine (PM) conducts contact tracing and treatment on post (vaccinate contacts, and contacts of contacts and monitor them for fever). PM reports cases to AMSA, coordinates with local public health. DHS contacts CMD GRP, RMC. HIO initiated.	Consider limiting access to the installation. Planned visits by groups may be cancelled or restricted	Consider change in FPCON IAW DoD Smallpox Response Plan	Smallpox patient is isolated and close contacts identified.	Report sent up Military, Medical, and PAO channels.
	c	Smallpox diagnosed in non-DoD beneficiary in surrounding community	Diagnosis made by civilian physician. Reported to Local PH Department	Local PH Department contacts MTF PM SVC. PM conducts contact tracing and treatment on post. Case finding initiated. HIO initiated.	Consider limiting access to the installation. Planned visits by groups may be cancelled or restricted	Consider change in FPCON IAW DoD Smallpox Response Plan	Smallpox patient is isolated and close contacts identified.	Report sent up Military, Medical, and PAO channels.
	d	2 or more cases diagnosed at any location.	Diagnosis made by medical personnel.	In addition to DoD Smallpox Response Plan 1.a. activities, consider mass vaccination in affected location.	Consider limiting access to the installation. Planned visits by groups to unit may be cancelled or restricted	In addition to DoD Smallpox Response Plan 1.a., consider law enforcement assistance with crowd control	Smallpox patients are isolated and close contacts identified.	Report sent up Military, Medical, and PAO channels. Large group cancellations sent to CMD GRP.
	e	Cases continue to appear despite appropriate interventions	Diagnosis by medical personnel	In addition to DoD Smallpox Response Plan 1.a. activities, evaluate vaccine response, vaccine coverage rates, unique virulence factors, environmental factors, host factors. Consult experts.	Consider limiting access to the installation. Planned visits by groups may be cancelled or restricted	Follow DoD Smallpox Response Plans 1.d.	Smallpox patients are isolated and close contacts identified.	Report sent up Military, Medical, and PAO channels. Large group cancellations sent to CMD GRP.

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2		Information / Risk Communication					
	a	Senior Army Leaders, Civilian Leaders, Civilian Health Officials have extremely high level of concern about response activities	Formal and informal communications. Comments in the press.	Educate leaders about the unique nature of the disease and dangers of inappropriate interventions. Consult with civilian and military experts. Deploy expert teams. Include civilian officials in response activities. Maintain effective reporting and communication.		Satisfaction expressed by leadership following briefings	Carefully state information requirements. Understand on-the-ground realities.
	b	Unsympathetic individuals or groups are concerned about the outbreak and are distrustful of the military or government	Individuals or groups approach the media, distribute inflammatory literature/email, hold demonstrations.	Include civilian experts and officials in activities. Base interventions on sound scientific evidence. Anticipate negative messages. Execute open and effective HIO campaign.	Consider limiting access to the installation	End of negative publicity	Advise Commanders on the pitfalls in communication in this type of environment
	c	Groups on post are concerned that they are not being treated equally or fairly	Grievances are filed with Union, Congressmen are contacted, media are contacted, demonstrations are held	Base interventions on sound scientific evidence. Execute effective HIO campaign.		End of complaints	Report to CG, Interest Groups, resident groups
	d	Individuals refuse to take the recommended vaccine.	Complaints are filed	Anticipate refusals and have alternate interventions or procedures in place. Consult with legal counsel and employee organizations. Execute effective HIO campaign.		Individuals agree to primary or alternate intervention	Report to CG, Interest Groups (Unions, etc.), resident groups
	e	Side effects or deaths due to vaccine.	Diagnosis by medical personnel or individuals approach the media, distribute inflammatory literature/email, hold demonstrations.	Anticipate side effects and/or deaths due to vaccine. Follow activities of DoD Smallpox Response Plan 1.a. and 2.b.	Consider limiting access to the installation. Planned visits by groups may be cancelled or restricted	Smallpox patient (or fatality) is isolated, close contacts identified, and end of negative publicity	Carefully state information requirements. Understand on-the-ground realities. Report of side effect or death sent up Military, Medical, and PAO channels.